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SUMMARY 
This paper examines the phenomenon of refugees and resettled persons in the process of forced 
migrations in the aftermath of man-made disasters. Although some of the ideas presented here could 
have wider application, the focus is on post-conflict zones within the former Yugoslavia, namely BiH. 
The paper uses the questions of ethnicity and nationalism within resettlement, dislocation and immi-
gration as a backdrop, into which the issue of globalization is also briefly reflected. The intention here 
is not to cover a wide range of pressing topics, but simply to relate a number of issues arising in con-
temporary large-scale forced migrations to a resurgence of cultural specificity and ethnicized nationa-
lism as counterpoints to globalization. The paper introduces the concept of “limbo diasporas” in the case 
of Bosnian refugees in Sweden through reflection and linkage with the aforementioned concepts. The 
paper ends with some recommendations and open questions on social rehabilitation and ethnic hea-
ling as well as some general conclusions. 
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“The longing of exiled people and refugees to return to their homeland, and the 
importance of the symbolic existence of that homeland, suggests that loss or 
destruction of place is as powerful an attachment as its presence.” 
Irwin Altman and Setha M. Low, from: Place Attachment, 1992 
Introduction 
Millions of refugees and displaced persons throughout the world still remain in exile 
due to fresh or continuing regional conflicts, civil wars, interethnic clashes and other 
hostile disputes. Returning to their homes is primarily made impossible because of con-
tinuing conflict, political instability and general insecurity. The unwillingness and deli-
berate obstruction by states, political leaderships and opposed groups and citizens to 
take these people back, makes the situation even more complicated. If the whole range of 
bureaucratic hindrances and obstacles are added, along with the general lack of housing 
and economic prospects, the picture looks very grim. Prolonged conflicts and other inter 
ethnic and religious violent disputes (whether they be civil wars, inter-state wars, factio-
nal fighting or merely an independence struggle, ethnic violence, sectarian strife, sepa-
ratist fighting or resistance to repression) have turned a considerable group of the world’s 
population into citizens of limbo status. 
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According to Refugees International, the number of refugees and displaced people 
in the world now exceeds 35 million, with the Middle East, Afghanistan, Pakistan and 
parts of Africa staggering under the burden of people who have been forced from their 
homes by war or drought. The conflicts in Africa, which involved almost a quarter of the 
continent’s countries, have been horrendous, particularly the case of Rwanda. As the 
consequence of conflict in Former Yugoslavia, over one million people remain ousted 
and displaced. This region witnessed the greatest and most rapid movement of people in 
Europe since the Second World War. The current conflicts in the Middle East, if unre-
solved, could lead to tens of thousands of fleeing refugees, creating perhaps the largest 
and most protracted group in the world today. An estimated 110,000 Western Saharan 
people were refugees at the end of 2001. In the 1990’s Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chech-
nya and Rwanda suffered huge waves of ethnic conflicts and consequently bore witness 
to an enormous forced flow of population.  
The phenomenon of immigration, as well as that of refugees, has proved to be 
somewhat confusing to theoreticians, who are forced to remain within frameworks of 
rather obsolete concepts, models, assumptions, categories, etc. The main theoretical prob-
lem has been that it is impossible to achieve full understanding of contemporary migra-
tory processes relying on one discipline alone, or by focusing on just one type of ana-
lysis. Indeed, any serious theoretical approach to the problem requires a complex, mul-
tidisciplinary variety of viewpoints, category levels and assumptions. Research in these 
matters should obviously be multifaceted and include a certain number of disciplines 
such as sociology, social psychology, politics, social history, economics, individual 
psychology, political history, etc. Hence this paper emphasizes a multifaceted approach 
of thematizing around important concepts and linking the issues. 
There are some central questions that this paper addresses: to what extent (if any) 
globalization is related to nationalism and ethnicity? What are the underlying reasons 
for ethnic (and religious) conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina? What role, if any, can re-
fugees play as the diaspora in the host country and what are the obstacles to both their 
integration and their return to the homeland? In which way can multiculturalism trigger 
racism and xenophobia? These issues will be reflected upon using the former Yugoslavia, 
namely Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a light motif. The recent and ongoing ethnic armed 
conflicts around the world also impact on some of these unresolved, complex, and, at 
times, very contradictory issues. Although there may at times appear to be many cross-
cutting variables, the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina shows that this is in the very na-
ture of the phenomenon. 
Ethnicity, Nationalism and Globalization Reflected in Former 
Yugoslavia 
Ethnie (ethnic communities) may be defined as named human populations with 
shared ancestry, myths, histories and cultures, having an association with a specific ter-
ritory and a sense of solidarity (Smith, 1997). Taken in this way, ethnicity has functioned 
throughout history as a way of distinguishing and separating social groups from others 
who are felt to threaten or oppress them (Holton, 1998). It seems that, for some, ethni-
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city offers higher levels of security against threats like forced removal from a certain 
territory, death, rape and enslavement in conflicts, unemployment and poverty resulting 
from economic competition, migrant assimilation, etc., than do many other sources of 
identity. This, instead, offers its members symbolic as well as material forms of gratifi-
cation and security. The security of place in history, emotionally charged symbols of con-
temporary identity, and religious associations are some of the factors accompanying and 
reinforcing ethnic group membership.  
Conflicts that are the result of breakup of multinational entities (usually of an armed 
nature) responsible for millions of refugees (as in the case of former Yugoslavia), are 
propelled by an amalgam of ethnic, cultural, territorial, economic, power-political and 
religious motivations. In the absence of any real democratic tradition and economic 
prosperity, these conflicts usually explode rapidly and are difficult to stop. After 38 years 
of conflict in Cyprus between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, the two groups still have deep 
religious, linguistic, political and ethnic differences. Even if the conflicts were stopped, 
the reality of bringing about a just and long-term prosperous solution would become a 
daunting task for the international community and people on the ground (Table 1). 


















Africa 050 014 014 028 038 
Asia 042 016 008 019 043 
Europe 042 002 002 005 005 
The Americas 044 001 001 002 003 
Middle East 014 004 004 029 011 
World Totals 192 037 029 015 100 
Source: The Armed Conflicts 2003 Report, Project Ploughshares, Institute of Peace and Conflict Stu-
dies, Conrad Grebel College, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada  
The recent events in the Balkans have brought the question of nationalism to the 
European agenda again, itself a burning, sinewy and unavoidable historical problem. The 
issue of nationality, and especially nationalism, is present today not only as an inheri-
tance of the past, but as a consequence of new international and national relations in 
Europe as a whole, and relations within its multinational states themselves. While na-
tionalism as we know it in contemporary Europe does not have the same stature that it 
has in other parts of the globe (especially in Africa and Asia), it is undoubtedly still ap-
parent to a sufficient degree, and it is often the root cause of many antagonisms of modern 
day European reality. Today in Europe, it is difficult to find a country without, in one shape 
or another, the question of nationality and nationalism on the agenda, whether as an in-
ternal or external (international) problem. This simple fact seems reason enough for the 
issue of nationalism to be addressed very seriously, an issue that is ominously present 
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everywhere and one that still “disturbs” patterns of everyday living for a lot of Euro-
pean inhabitants and even nations as a whole. What makes this complicated problem 
even worse and aggravates the situation further, as in the case of former Yugoslavia, is 
the attitude toward nationalism, one that regards it as a largely backward, historically 
anachronistic and highly negative phenomenon. This only widens the problem, brin-
ging new seeds of mistrust. It seems, therefore, valid to ask if the nature of the problem 
lies in the understanding of the inner substance and spiritual impetus of national move-
ments – should solutions be sought from the international system which can remove all 
restraints and restrictions on the development of national spirit and cultures and con-
finements on how national identity is represented and practised? 
There is no doubt that today ethnicity is in ill repute; its reputation at perhaps an 
all-time low in the aftermath of ethnic cleansing in the formerly multicultural and mul-
tinational Yugoslavia. It is unfortunate, however, that the fear of aggressive ethnicity of 
the Yugoslav kind is often seen as a reason for opposing minority ethnicities in Wes-
tern European democratic states (Rex, 1996). 
A common European Union response to the crisis and tragedy in former Yugo-
slavia and questions of national identity and nation state building has been lacking; this 
apparent indifference may be due to the domestic political problems that have been bur-
ning for long time in Great Britain (Northern Ireland), France (Corsica), Spain (Catalonia) 
and Italy (South Tyrol) respectively. In the case of former Yugoslavia, as well as other 
Eastern and Central European countries, liberation from communist rule would not have 
been possible without the unifying and mobilizing force of nationalism (Schulze, 1998).  
Ethnicity and racial differences have often been wrongly perceived as surviving 
anachronisms, dating from pre-modern, traditional societies. The fact of the matter is that 
from the late 1980’s to the present, there has been a resurgence of nationalism, traditio-
nalism and religious fundamentalism (giving rise to terrorism in its most extreme form) 
alongside trends toward growing globalization. This has manifested itself in the explo-
sion of regional, cultural and religious differences in former Eastern Europe, as well as 
Africa and other parts of the world. Cultural differences thus became a new source of 
conflict and an important dimension in the struggle between the global and local, pro-
ducing lasting confrontations that have proved deeper and fundamental than anybody 
previously thought (Kellner, 1998). It could be argued that the “recent” revival of na-
tionalism, ethnicity and fundamentalism may be a consequence or a “simple” resistance 
to the often disruptive, unjust/unfair, impersonal and dividing nature and impact of glo-
balization forces. The logic behind such arguments is quite straightforward: culture is 
far harder to globalize than technology or economy. 
According to Manuel Castells, the forces of globalization are one of the more im-
portant factors that could have triggered such a defensive reaction around the world (Cas-
tells, 2002). Reactions were often unified around principles of national, territorial and, 
in recent cases, religious identity, where new conflicts have emerged exhibiting a surge 
of nationalism and fundamentalism, involving clashes of cultures and even civilizations 
(Huntington, 1997; Castells, 1997). In this context, feelings of insecurity are further 
enhanced by the growing multi-ethnicity and multiculturalism of European society, a 
fact which (coupled with others factors mentioned below) can trigger racism and xeno-
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phobia where people affirm their identity both against a supranational state and against 
cultural diversification (Castells, 1998). As a consequence of this, or as a strong side 
effect, direct opposition to globalization now plays a role in the search for new identity 
and new spirituality.  
Some have suggested that religious fundamentalism is linked inextricably to all 
this, manifesting itself more strongly at times throughout history when global networks 
of power, information, wealth and prosperity bypass, disconnect and exclude large seg-
ments of societies, regions, nations and ethnic groups (Castells, 2002).  
One of the pitfalls of theoretical methodology in this area of study is speculating 
and manipulating with abstract categories and abstract formulas in a way of abstract in-
tuiting nationalism, religious fundamentalism, ethnic conflict and then applying it to 
specific situations. While categories must be properly defined, over abstraction will not 
lead to concrete analysis and answers. Specific differences in, for example, genesis of 
national historical development should be observed. The truth is obviously concrete and 
we should refrain of speaking in abstracto terms.  
The purpose here is not to probe deeper into these matters but rather highlight some 
of the more relevant aspects that could have caused the ethnic conflict, broken habita-
tion and forced migrations of millions of people in Former Yugoslavia. 
When communism fell in former Yugoslavia, it was replaced by an ideological va-
cuum in a period of uncertainty. Undoubtedly, the historical, social and political back-
ground of these peoples had been greatly shaped by the totalitarian regime, which lasted 
for nearly half a century. This period resulted in the overall material devastation of the 
country and deterioration in individual standards of living. This was reflected in the 
collapse of morality, a fall into an ideological, psychological and moral vacuum, leading 
to hopelessness, apathy, fear, resignation, disorientation and discouragement. Such mo-
ral, political and economic devastation provoked enormous inhibited frustrations and 
animosities that dated back centuries but were frozen during communist rule. The sup-
pression of democratic movements in Croatia and Serbia in the 1970’s was another ne-
gative factor. The communist regime headed by Josip Broz Tito’s dictatorship turned 
former Yugoslavia into a kind of historical refrigerator of national, ethnic and religious 
differences, which preserved deep historical disputes and an obvious civilization gap, but 
which also produced a well functioning buffer between the western and eastern political 
spheres. The negative energy that accumulated over the decades of Party rule reached 
“critical mass” during the worst decade of the Yugoslav economic crisis (1980–1990). 
Unfortunately, that same dissatisfaction and negative energy was harnessed fully by 
those harbouring imperial tendencies within the Serbian dominated regime, whose ag-
gressive and domineering social ideology was projected on the hopelessness of the sub-
missive masses. The aggression and eventual war that this regime waged, triggered a chain 
reaction of nationalist, ethnic and religious antagonisms that resulted in a saddeningly 
great number of conflicts.  
It is important at this point to emphasize that religious antagonism did not pro-
duce religious fundamentalism in the form that we are seeing today in the Middle East. 
The situation in former Yugoslavia was slightly different. Religion and identity did, how-
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ever, inevitably become linked over the course of the conflict, although not inextricably, 
with the former assuming an extremely important role in the public life of the individual 
nations of the region. This “threat of national identity”, for all the wrong reasons, pro-
vided a backdrop for the catastrophe that engulfed former Yugoslavia and resulted in 
suffering and misery for millions of its inhabitants (Cviic, 1997). The nationalistic ten-
dencies of the leaders and groups that were spearheading the conflict often blended with 
religion, which was then used as a weapon to galvanize support for violent conflicts 
between groups. Although participation rates in formal religion were low among all 
three groups, most members of the respective groups did identify themselves with their 
respective dominant religion (Powers, 1996; Huntington, 1996).  
Religion also played a vital national role in former Yugoslavia, especially in Bos-
nia and Herzegovina. In Serbia, the Orthodox Church carried the banner of national con-
sciousness during Turkish rule, filling the gap of the feudal class, while Croatians had the 
Catholic Church and their own language as the twin guardian of the national conscious-
ness, considering themselves to be the final outpost of Western Civilization, a defensive 
barrier against the East. After the breakup of Yugoslavia, Serbian and Croatian ethnic 
groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina felt that their national identity was under threat, this 
insecurity promoting a need to identify with their Kin countries. The end result was, pre-
dictably, a battle for territory. Both wanted to establish strong (i.e. land) connections to 
their kin proper – Serbia and Croatia. In the case of Bosnians (Muslims), the situation was 
quite different. In Bosnia, their religious and national reawakening was foremostly a res-
ponse to ethnic cleansing and the possibility of annihilation at the hands of the Serbs. The 
nation that had never properly formed and had been defined “negatively” from the out-
set by the communist regime, was now being identified and established through religion, 
where one segment of the community set a course for Islamic fundamentalist waters. 
The overall result could be looked upon as confirmation of Samuel Huntington’s thesis 
on the clash of civilizations, where he observes that each nation turned to its nation-
proper, having the backing of its kin country (the Western Christian world basically 
stood behind Croatia, while the Eastern Orthodox one backed Serbia) whereas the Bos-
nian Muslims were supported by the Islamic world, which represented both a “virtual 
proper” and kin country (Huntington, 1997). Despite all this, one has to appreciate that 
these conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina were mainly politically and economically ba-
sed, with religion playing a minor role. Hence, although it was closely connected with 
national consciousness, religion was mainly used to mobilize the people for political, 
economical and territorial interests. Consequently, the Bosnian example should be vie-
wed not so much as a war of civilizations, but more a war of ethnicities and religions. 
The ethnic tolerance and harmony that once existed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
that unique and impossibly idealistic project of the communist regime, degenerated into 
the worst and bloodiest conflict since WWII and the division of the country along strong 
ethnic lines. A cursory glance at the ethnic map of Bosnia and Herzegovina before and 
after the war gives one a stark reminder of the complexities at hand (Figure 1 and 2). 
The legacy of this terrible conflict clearly indicates that the Procrustean bed of tolerance 
and multiculturalism as envisaged by the European Union, cannot be achieved over-
night (if ever). 
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Figure 1 and 2: Ethnic majorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1991 census and ethnic 
division after the Dayton Agreement, 1997 
 
 
Source: Based on the maps at the Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, University of Texas, Austin, 
2003 
Tigran Hasic: Ethnic Conflict and the Right to Return…, Migracijske i etničke teme 20 (2004), 1: 29–49 
 36 
Dealing with Forced Migrants and Diasporas 
The complex, multi-faceted nature of migration gets even more complicated when 
interwoven with issues such as armed conflict, ethnic cleansing, genocide, rapid and for-
ced movement of refugees and creation of ad hoc diasporas (groups of people, in most 
cases of original homogenous entity, dispersed from their homelands). The whole pro-
cess of migration is a natural phenomenon, occurring throughout the history of mankind. 
People have moved voluntarily to more hospitable and promising locations searching for 
better access to economic, social, cultural, educational and environmental opportunities.  
Civil conflict, persecution, and political instability also impel people from their 
home countries to seek safe haven elsewhere (Martin and Widgren, 1996). In cases of 
forced migration, such as the armed conflicts in former Yugoslavia, very few, if any, of 
these factors are the prevailing ones. After being forcibly ejected from their original ha-
bitat, a refugee population is solely concerned with an immediate return to the original 
habitat. Such a desire is normally incompatible with their dominant need at that mo-
ment (i.e. a move to stability, security and safety), which is of paramount importance if 
their lives are to be saved. Sometimes in these cases, it is difficult to distinguish (espe-
cially in the Bosnian example) between refugees, displaced persons and those that are 
moving for other reasons. One thing, however, applies to all these groups – they are, in 
one way or another, forced from their homelands into migration. Contemporary use of 
the concept homeland is predicated on the existence of a nation-state; it is presumed that 
since everyone is a member of a national community, he/she also feels at home there. 
Nikos Papastergiadis observes, however, that this definition ignores the vast number of 
people who have become homeless either because they have flown from their own na-
tion or, due to historical reasons, their homeland was never constituted as a nation-state 
(Papastergiadis, 2000). 
Migrations do not simply happen. They are produced, patterned and embedded in 
larger social, economic and political processes. While some individuals may experience 
migration as the outcome of a personal decision, the option to migrate is itself socially 
produced (Sassen, 1990). International migration is defined by the UN as movement 
from one's nation of birth or citizenship to another of the world's 192 nations for a pe-
riod of 12 months or more. Migration is as old as humankind wandering in search of 
food, but international migration is a relatively recent development – it was only in the 
20th century that the system of nation-states, passports, and visas developed to regulate 
and record the flow of people across borders (Martin, 1999). 
People are forced to move abroad in order to survive, either because their own 
state is the cause of their predicament or because it is unable to meet these basic re-
quirements. They become in many respects genuine international outcasts, stateless, in 
the deepest meaning of the term: that is, the sense in which their predicament stems 
from distinctively political conditions (Sacknowe, 1985). They have “resettled” tempo-
rarily or permanently in strange, new and previously unknown places, amongst people 
that they do not know – often amongst people who do not want to know them. Unfortu-
nately, forced migration and consequent resettlement also happens to a third (new) coun-
try. This is sometimes the only way a refugee can be guaranteed international protec-
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tion in cases where he or she is denied adequate protection in the country of asylum and 
cannot repatriate. Such cases were commonplace for migrants from former Yugoslav 
conflict zones. When large refugee flows occur, resettlement is generally not a realistic 
option except for a tiny minority of individuals or groups of people. Indeed, it is often 
undesirable. Many refugees wish to live near their countries of origin, not only because 
they prefer a familiar cultural and social environment, but also as it lends an air of rea-
lism to their ultimate goal, which is to return home. However, although voluntary repat-
riation is almost always the best long-term solution for most refugees, some will always 
require resettlement, for political and security reasons, or because of vulnerability. In 
some cases, there seems to be little hope of any form of repatriation, and at the same time 
no possibility of durable local integration into the country of asylum. In such instances, 
resettlement to a third country may be the only feasible option (UNHCR, 2004).  
Diasporas can be viewed partly as transnational groups of emigrants living abroad 
in host countries, whilst maintaining economic, political, social and emotional ties with 
their homeland and other diasporic communities of the same origin (Faist, 2000; Tambiah, 
2000). The concept of diaspora involves the notion of return to an original homeland 
whereas, in point of fact, many migrant communities have no such intention (Rex, 2001). 
In the current discourse on diasporas, confusion might arise because of the multiplicity of 
meanings assigned to this concept. William Safran has investigated major dimensions 
or parameters that identify key variables applicable to the analysis and explanation of 
diasporic phenomena. According to him, the diasporic phenomenon is a collective forced 
dispersion of a religious or ethnic group, often political in nature, where an important role 
is played by collective memory, which transmits both the historical causes of the disper-
sion and a specific cultural heritage. These people also feel a sense of alienation in their 
host country and at the same time an idealization of their homeland as a place to which 
they will return. Additionally, they retain relationships with the homeland whose exis-
tence supports their own ethno-communal consciousness and solidarity (Safran, 1991).  
Diaspora is a word most familiar to historians investigating the Jewish commu-
nity, and it is therefore unsurprising to find a direct ascendant of this term in the history 
of Jewish dispersion (to describe communities suffering traumatic social and political ex-
perience). For our purposes, it means people of any culture who have dispersed from a 
former concentration, with their own cultures and languages (Mudimbe and Engel, 1999). 
The main features of diasporas (such as a history of dispersed memories of homeland, 
alienation in the host country, desire for eventual return, ongoing support for the 
homeland and a collective identity) become even more conflicting and counterproductive 
in the case of limbo diasporas (the example of the Cuban diaspora in United States being 
the exception, where positive attitude and contribution to the new surrounding is the 
norm). This probably presents the gravest long-term consequence for forced migrants 
in a multi-ethnic, armed induced conflict, where the homeland never attains a level of 
stability sufficient to ensure a safe return. As such a situation may last indefinitely (as 
was the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina due to delayed political solutions and prolon-
ged insecurities) the migrants affected tend to gravitate towards the formation of what 
may be referred to as “Limbo Diasporas”, i.e. people who never become fully integrated 
(for the most part), whilst remaining alienated from their original homeland (even in the 
cases where they return). 
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The 1990s were a decade of all-pervasive conflict in ex-Yugoslavia, which took a 
truly disproportionate toll. Nearly one tenth of the combined population of Bosnia-Her-
zegovina, Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, a UNHCR-estimated 1.7 
million people, remain displaced and in need of a lasting solution. The NATO interven-
tion in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Kosovo in 1999 has created an enor-
mous movement and influx of refugees of not only Kosovars (some 800,000), but also 
residents of Yugoslavia seeking asylum primarily in EU countries. 
Such international forced migration clearly creates detachment from a territory 
and detachment from one’s own ethnic community. The creation of these diasporas is 
based on foundations of suffering and trauma (which led to the dispersal of members of 
an ethnic community), who nonetheless aspire to return to their homeland (Rex, 1997b). 
For those that may never return, integration becomes the preoccupying force of sustain-
able survival and assimilation – the only other option being complete isolation and in-
ner-segregation. In the case of forced migrants, international refugees, and involuntary 
displaced persons, i.e. in the case of people from former Yugoslavia, the conversion in-
to real diasporas may well never happen, mainly due to complication arising from their 
constant outlook on the situation, namely seeing it as a temporary one and envisaging a 
return to the homeland when the political situation and circumstances change.  
“Limbo Diasporas” 
One aspect of the problem of immigration of Bosnian refugees to Sweden shall 
now be briefly addressed, namely difficulties encountered concerning the creation of so-
cial capital from within that diaspora, which could subsequently be used to support de-
mocratic processes and economic recovery in their homeland. This particular aspect 
has been chosen not because of any specific importance, but because it acts as a perfect 
backdrop upon which the fundamental features of the limbo diaspora may be high-
lighted. Needles to say, the possibility of a sustainable return to the homeland is a fun-
damental precondition for any discussion on these matters.  
It would go beyond the framework of our present discussion if this complex and dif-
ficult problem was analyzed in great detail, and therefore only a few of the most salient 
issues shall be dealt with here. The real difficulty in presenting some of these points is, 
of course, the complexity and multifaceted nature of the subject itself and the inappli-
cability of definite, precise theoretical schemes and scientific methods to the subject. 
Therefore, some of the assertions in such a discussion should be taken as amounting to no 
more than a declaration of principle, i.e. without precise recommendations in terms of 
application or policy making. Having said that, even such a declaration may contribute to 
decisive determinations arising in decision-making frameworks. Any further talk, though, 
without precise, quantitative investigation of these determinations would lead us into 
the realm of unproductive speculation and conceptual confusion. Evidently, an element 
of speculation is unavoidable, but it would be pointless to discuss these matters without 
referring to precise quantitative analyses of the diaspora and homeland.  
Only in this way is one able to further elucidate on some of the basic assumptions 
concerning the scope and value of social capital, which can be “produced” by diaspora in 
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the process of democratization in the homeland. What is decisive here is an evaluation 
of the real extent and value of such social capital, given the unlikelihood of any sus-
tainable return to the homeland. Therefore, the starting point for our analysis must be 
firmly rooted in reality, reflecting the situation on the ground as it stands today, rather 
than concentrating on abstract “what ifs” and predicting future developments.  
As has been often repeated in much of the theoretical writing about emigration 
and refugees, a diaspora exists when “an ethnie or nation suffers some kind of trauma-
tic event which leads to the dispersal of its members, who nonetheless, continue to as-
pire to return to the homeland” (Rex, 1997a; Braziel and Mannur, 2003). Although the 
term diaspora has been loosely used, the above description can be quite accurately ap-
plied to Bosnian (predominantly Bosniac – Muslim) refugees in Sweden. Bosniacs as a 
national (or ethnic) group have been dispersed across many countries (and several con-
tinents). Moreover, all these groups from Bosnia and Herzegovina (Serbs, Croats and 
Muslims alike) have suffered a clearly traumatic experience, and most of them are still 
primarily concerned with the possibility of a return, sooner or later, to their homeland. 
The diaspora of Bosnia and Herzegovina is a clear-cut case of dealing with groups of 
migrants from economically inferior (backward, underdeveloped, etc.) to economically 
successful countries: Europe, Scandinavia, USA, Canada and Australia (at least in the 
great majority of cases). It is not quite clear how many of them have a strong desire to 
return to Bosnia and Herzegovina and how many of them simply seek assimilation in 
the country of settlement, retaining some kind of myth of return.  
What then, beyond family, are the other social and cultural links of the diaspora in 
Sweden? How can its structure be understood? Do they see their present situation as 
temporary, envisaging a return to the homeland when political, material-economic, and 
social circumstances change? Given their (geographic) isolation from their fellow na-
tionalists, are they necessarily nationalistic in their outlook? What is the percentage of 
those who cannot envisage such a change in political circumstances at home (with re-
gard to democratization, the rule of law, legal protection, human rights, welfare state, 
economic prosperity, living standards, the fight against corruption, crime, etc.) and are 
committed to finding a new life in the country of refuge? Answers to these questions 
are not easy to come by. Looking first at the country of origin, the real obstacles to the 
“diaspora – social capital” should first be identified there. What divisions exist in the 
homeland in terms of nation, religion, ideology, culture and social psychology? What 
kind of democracy and political system is at work there? Is multiculturalism really alive? 
To partly understand these issues, the underlying factors for the migrants their flight 
from their homeland must be established, factors which are connected with both the 
possibility of return and the socio-cultural and politico-economic context of the host 
country. Answers to these questions may then provide us with a better understanding of 
why this group can be considered as a Limbo Diaspora.  
It is self-evident that these people from Bosnia and Herzegovina moved to new 
countries against their will; in other words, they were forced to leave for various reasons: 
prosecution, armed conflict, ethnic cleansing or, sometimes, simply insecurity. They 
were completely unprepared for integration into a new (Western European) context. 
Being dispersed outside the traditional borders of their homeland also meant settling in 
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a place with a completely different cultural and political matrix. The move represented, 
to use Alvin Toffler’s words, a “Future Shock” for this dispersed group, who, on making 
a jump, were confronted with a completely different situation to the one they left behind. 
A great number of people lost the essential elements of their livelihood, having no means 
of returning or reclaiming what was theirs. Already in a state of flux, the group’s confu-
sion was further compounded by a cultural, economic, social and intellectual shock. The 
question was whether these two contexts would work together and, if so, what kind of 
integration or disintegration could be expected? Sweden generously opened its gates to 
some 60,000 refugees (migrants) from Bosnia and Herzegovina, who, over the course 
of time (some 10 years), started to “become” part of Swedish society.  
The other difficulty facing refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina living in Swe-
den, is the attitude of the nation state towards this diaspora settlement. Are the Swedes 
welcoming hosts? What kind of nationalism do refugees experience in Sweden? What 
is the central theme of political culture in Swedish society? There is a number of fac-
tors which impact directly on a diaspora group: democracy, open society, welfare state, 
human rights, equality, equal opportunity, rational and empirical society, material pro-
ductive civilization, postindustrial and technological, network society, social security, 
environmental policy, the rule of law, democratic public opinion, free press, etc. At the 
same time there exist many other aspects to Swedish society which are more reminis-
cent of the socialist political culture which was prevalent in their former homeland: 
collectivism, principles of equality, solidarity, anti-elitism, conformity (displayed via 
reaction against standing out and departure from accepted norms), over creativity, 
freedom of individual undertakings, etc. 
The results and influences of the diaspora of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Sweden 
are to be found mostly in the power of (mono-ethnic) institutions created by them: orga-
nizations on different levels, collective groups, clubs, unions, associations, administra-
tions, committees, forums, etc. (all of which are reminiscent of those once existing within 
the former Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia, representing a strong link with the totalita-
rian foundations of the homeland). In terms of an ideological consensus, Swedish society 
tends to recognize the possibility of separate cultures co-existing, although this is deemed 
to be a private sphere in which the state should not interfere. Religious tolerance is there-
fore the norm in Swedish society (as is the case in most western countries). Such a to-
lerant outlook is the result of a secularization of politics and education. Refugees from 
Bosnia and Herzegovina have created a unique, specific and hybrid diaspora: their ex-
Yugoslav collectivist mentality, based on a more rigid style of socialism, has been unable 
to fully comprehend and adapt to the Swedish (collectivist) model of egalitarian society. 
Consequently, the diaspora lives in a kind of limbo status: in the middle of nowhere, 
towards the road to somewhere. In short, having shed their communist social being, the 
refugees were subsequently incapable of integrating in the freer, democratic society of 
their Swedish hosts, a society founded on traditions of enlightenment individualism. 
What seems to surface as the fundamental problem of the Bosnian limbo diaspora 
in Sweden is that it has attained some elements of democracy with Swedish specificum. 
Following the fall of communism, this group did not have sufficient time for the con-
sciousness of social being to mature, especially when still carrying the burdens of a tota-
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litarian system on its back, a system which for decades had dictated the psychological 
makeup of its citizens. Accordingly, the totalitarian consciousness becomes more inte-
resting as a socio-psychological category than an ideological one, creating a negative bias 
in the democratization of post-communist societies like former Yugoslavia, the reper-
cussions of which are clearly visible in the lives of the Swedish diaspora group. Coupled 
with that, we have the classical notion of diasporic consciousness (Cohen, 1997), where 
the diaspora identifies mainly with the ancestral homeland and with people of their own 
origin, both in the homeland and the host country. This also creates problems for sustai-
nable integration and interaction and leads to both forced and self-induced alienation and 
segregation. As Castles and Davidson observe, this is one of the four natural variants of 
ethnic consciousness, which also include assimilation, separatist consciousness and trans-
cultural consciousness (Castles and Davidson, 2000). The impossibility of reintegration 
in the homeland, non-acceptance of new surroundings and the loss of an irretrievable sys-
tem of values belonging to a defunct regime are the main features which combine to con-
fer limbo status upon the diaspora and the vacuum wherein they reside. 
Two problems which are to be expected in the long run in any of the receiving 
societies (host country) are those of xenophobia and racism, with ghettoization as an 
obvious accompanying phenomenon (opportunities in employment, social networks, 
etc.) on the one hand, and assimilation on the other. An irrational fear of foreigners or 
strangers appears in situations of economic crisis, high unemployment, protruded so-
cial welfare, cultural differences, loss of national identity, etc. In general, the terms xe-
nophobia and racism are quite broadly defined applying to an array of racial issues: ra-
cial and cultural abuse, forms of racial and ethnic discrimination, which, for example, 
deprives immigrants or invandrare of equal rights, social and legal rights of immi-
grants, political rights, minority identities and minority cultures, the right to maintain 
their own culture, and so on. It is at this point that multiculturalism enters the frame. 
Multiculturalism involves, in principle, both an attempt to bestow full (equal) rights 
upon minorities and recognition of their right to maintain their separate cultures. Usually 
multiculturalism implies the existence of a private and communal sphere within which 
the government need not interfere. An unexpectedly large influx of refugees and the con-
sequences thereof, coupled with an inevitably manufactured process of multiculturalism, 
can trigger xenophobia and racism. Recognition of the globalization of economic activity 
and the need for the protection of immigrants’ civil rights and their full integration into 
the host society is a point made by Saskia Sassen, who states that a nation’s attitude 
towards migrants (i.e. either welcoming them as guests or disparaging them as aliens), 
is often based upon the reasons behind their immigration (Sassen, 2000).  
The emergence of multiculturalism as a prominent term in Western discourse con-
cerning ethnic conflict coincides with increasing awareness in Western industrial 
societies, especially over the last two decades, that ethnicity had not lost its saliency in 
the lives of large numbers of people. This is extremely important for groups such as 
Limbo Diasporas. In its strict sense, multiculturalism can be workable as a basis for so-
cial cohesion and integration. However, it is not the only way in which social cohesion 
can be achieved within a context of ethnic diversity (UNESCO, 1995). Multiculturalism, 
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with its three flagships of respect, equality and diversity tends to promote coexistence 
between diverse ethnic groups in the social structure of society, recognizing its members 
and communities as equals. It also advocates and ensures that all citizens can keep their 
distinct cultural identity, take pride in their heritage and have a sense of belonging. This 
approach, however, can simultaneously heighten ethnocentrism, ethnoexclusion, and 
ethnonationalism, which amount to a destructive factor in the integration and building 
of a nation (Watson, 2001). Ethnicity, with its negative offspring (negative ethnic poli-
tical aspirations, discrimination, violation of human rights, hatred, suppression of mi-
norities, tension, and ethnic conflict and violence) poses a challenge to the fundamental 
principles of multiculturalism including racial and ethnic harmony, cross-cultural under-
standing, promotion of innovation and creativity, discouragement of ghettoization, etc.  
Any effort to formulate policies of managing ethnically and culturally diverse so-
cieties needs to consider not only the specific programs and practices but also the social 
context and the objectives of the State and its citizens. Successful management of multi-
culturalism and multiethnic societies requires not only a democratic policy, but a struggle 
against social inequalities and exclusion (UNESCO, 1995). 
There are also political aspects to consider when considering a diaspora’s possible 
return to its homeland. Currently in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the political climate is still 
opposed to the idea of expatriates coming home. There are also analytical and quan-
titative problems associated with the possible return of professionals to different areas 
and positions. Recently, the parliament there, in a decision which is sure to have pro-
found ramifications for its diaspora, rejected the notion of dual citizenship. This unfa-
vourable outcome was yet another cruel blow aimed at the long-suffering diaspora, who 
now appear destined to become the country’s neglected, disregarded and forgotten ci-
tizens. It is through such acts of gross insensitivity that the character of the Limbo Dia-
spora is shaped. The political situation is deeply affected, if not completely defined, by de 
facto protectorate status of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The country is a unique phenome-
non in Europe: the combination of a former parliamentary democracy and free elec-
tions under the “dictatorship” of the international community. The government is itself 
ruled by the dictates of the EU, who maintain a firm control over the protectorate using 
a heady blend of threats, blackmail and sanctions, the eventual goal being to bring 
Bosnia and Herzegovina “up the speed” with the rest of Europe. Unfortunately, how-
ever, the catastrophic economic situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and its overall 
material misery are a very weak foundation for the strengthening of democracy, at least 
when looked upon from social and sociological viewpoint. To make matters worse, the 
social and individual sociology – social capital – is in an unrecognizably poor state. This 
(post)-traumatized society has lost a great deal of professionals, as well as its young. 
Those left behind are faced with an uncertain existence: diminished material means, 
low wages, high unemployment, frustration, apathy, resignation, physical and mental 
fatigue, despair, hopelessness and physical and mental illness in the wake of the hor-
rible period of war and post-war traumas. Understandably, perhaps, attitudes formed in 
such a climate towards the diaspora tend to be very negative. The divisions within Bos-
nian society, mistrust, corruption, the strong communist heritage, political defragmenta-
tion and the EU dictate are some of the underlying reasons for the lack of democracy 
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which aggravates an already volatile situation. Those that can make a change for the 
better (i.e. create social capital) – the young – seem to have only one strong motive 
today: to leave as soon as possible, perhaps to join the growing ranks of what appears 
to be a new migratory phenomenon: the Limbo Diaspora.  
Towards Social Rehabilitation, Ethnic Healing and Acceptance 
According to the UNHCR, in the past 24 months close to 150,000 refuges have re-
turned to “minority areas”1 in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is still a very low number 
and, for reasons mentioned earlier (insecurity, instability and lack of prosperity), this 
trend is continuing at a very low pace. As the country is still in a state of dysfunction, 
the international quasi-protectorate will have to remain in place for the foreseeable 
future until a consensus solution can be found where all those wanting to return can 
truly do so. It should also be stated that, in the context of a permanent political solution, 
it would be unjust and counterproductive to try to solve these problems by applying new 
or other forms of pressure or violence on ethnic communities, as that can only have a 
counter-effect. The international community can mediate and assist in nation building 
or even in promoting civil societies, but cannot enforce such solutions by any means. 
Promoting job creation and prosperity so that people have a productive outlet for their 
energies and a chance to build a better life is a sine qua non for any rehabilitation of 
these areas and for the return of refugees. The second, parallel factor is the political 
stability and a just solution for everyone in the coming years. 
The most difficult post-conflict reconstruction is that of the social fabric. Settlements, 
buildings and infrastructure are usually the priority areas when it comes to rebuilding from 
the ashes of war. The torn social networks, however, are extremely hard to recreate and 
often trust lost can never be regained, precluding any real return to normal habitation.  
As human relationships come under the microscope and are central to any long-
term peace building effort (as well as for the “possible” return of parts of diaspora), they 
must be guided, as Sultan Barakat points out, by goals of hope, healing and reconcilia-
tion. These three factors become underlying tiers in the social reconstruction process 
(Barakat, 1998). Hope is found in the cessation of hostilities as well as in initial recon-
struction, relief operations and sustained involvement carried out by the international do-
nor community. Healing is of a more complex nature and can only be realized through 
comprehensive mid to long-term multi-faceted strategies for ending violence and sub-
sequent rehabilitation of communities.  
The driving force in encouraging (and even initiating) healing is helping the af-
flicted population to deal with the social, political and economic problems and chaos 
that usually surrounds them in these cases (Staub, 1996). The important thing is to bring 
                                                     
1 According to the Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees of the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (September 2002), seven years after the signing of the Dayton accords some 613,700 re-
fugees are still to be found in more than 40 countries around the world. The number is actually much 
higher if one takes into account those that have received citizenships and that most of these refugees 
were registered between 1992–1995. 
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back the feeling of community and stripped spatial identity, whilst simultaneously pro-
viding the afflicted population with a sustainable livelihood and economic base. These 
processes need to be initiated in the hope phase.  
The creation of significant bonds between the antagonistic groups (ethnic or reli-
gious) needs to be facilitated, together with the assistance in dealing with social, political, 
economic problems (Staub, 1996). On the other hand, healing cannot take place in a for-
ced, hasty manner, as the international community attempted in the case of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, where such a policy has only resulted in even more tensions, distrust and 
violence. Instead, the healing process must be administered and overseen in a way that 
respects and addresses the needs of the individuals and afflicted groups in a just and fair 
manner, with policy being dictated by the state of affairs on the ground at any given 
moment, rather than some overall gameplan. 
Post-conflict processes also need to address the issue of mistrust and betrayal. The 
healing process needs to focus around more emotional issues such as mistrust, hatred, 
fear and grief through activities like testimony (addressing the problem of truth), open 
dialogue (various ethnic dialogue groups), process of grief (mourning process on an in-
dividual level) and forgiveness and reconciliation (long-term process of forgiving not 
forgetting). In this respect, the healing strategies employed must include individual, fa-
mily and community levels in order to overcome, or at least alleviate, fear and mistrust. 
One of the most crucial factors, of course, is time, time needed to heal and to forgive. 
Without sufficient time allowed for healing and reconciliation to occur naturally, the 
whole effort will be stillborn (Agger and Jensen, 1996).  
Reconciliation represents the third tier in the social reconstruction process. It should 
comprise of initiatives, measures and actions denoting the point of encounter where con-
cerns about the past and the future can meet, i.e. acknowledging and adequately addressing 
the past as well as envisioning and keeping the future firmly in focus are the necessary 
ingredients for reframing the present (Lederach, 1997; Barakat, 1998). For this to happen, 
reconstruction initiatives that bring structural changes with enabling actions (i.e. swift 
practical mechanisms on the ground) must be invoked in order to deal with trauma, 
prejudice, discrimination and all other aspects of antagonisms. The keyword “aspect” is 
focused on building relationships between the antagonists (Lederach, 1997). A pro-
foundly important aspect of prevention and long-term reconciliation is the problem of 
raising children in an inclusive way (key role of education), also known as positive 
socialization (Staub, 1996). For the threefold aspect of social reconstruction (hope, hea-
ling and reconciliation in the aftermath of ethnic violence) to work, there must be just, 
equal and adequate involvement of all antagonist parties, while the international (re-
construction) community must function as the initiator, mediator and facilitator and not 
be seen as an imposing entity. 
Some Conclusions and Discussion 
In former Yugoslavia, the primacy of a nation united by bonds of blood has been 
demonstrated by violence, atrocities, mass murders and ethnic cleansing. This has led to 
the mass neurosis of “integral nationalism”, to the conviction that the nation inevitably 
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embodies the supreme values of a community and that this community is manifested only 
in an ethnically pure state (Schulze, 1998). Subsequently, as passions cooled, it became 
apparent that national identity and sovereignty alone are not and cannot be sufficient. It 
appears, then, that integration and globalization of nations and their inhabitants also 
has role to play, but only if the citizens affected are the subjects (as opposed to the ob-
jects) of any such integration. One of the reasons for this integral nationalism might be 
the fact that most of the people of South Eastern and Central Europe are victims of inse-
curity, having seen (especially in the recent past) their national identity, language, and 
historical culture threatened. In Western Europe, most of the major nations have for 
generations felt secure in their identity within their established nation states. That was not 
the case for many Eastern Bloc countries, especially not for the nations of former Yugo-
slavia. There, history has left much unfinished business and has left millions of people 
cut off from their “home nation”. 
Partition in the post-ethnic conflict context seems a very unviable solution on 
paper, as in the cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and even Macedonia. As a re-
medy, it is rarely sought due to the near impossibility of creating homogenous successor 
states. In other words, it is extremely difficult to draw clean dividing lines between ethnic 
groups (Burg, and Shoup, 1999). But, though hard it seems, partition needs to be ac-
knowledged as one of the possible solutions for the situation on the ground if it enables 
people to return and (re) build new and destroyed habitats. The past 30 years has seen 
the fragmentation of several countries and states, usually along ethnic lines. In some 
respects, it is no wonder that “irrational” and artificially created borders are often the 
roots of many ethnic and inter-state conflicts. The rationale behind any partition can 
only be found in total consensus of all parties involved, a matter to be resolved by an 
internationally accepted redrawing of boundaries but foremostly by a referendum and 
consensus between the afflicted parties. It seems that in the case of Bosnia and Herze-
govina these partitions amounted to little more than de facto changes based on rights of 
conquest, and their dubious legitimacy could eventually cause more misery, mistrust, 
violence and ethnic cleansing. In sharp contrast, the example of almost all European 
Union countries and their subsequent tranquility post-1945, testifies to painful, but ne-
cessary redrawing and partition.  
It seems that the Balkan region presents an almost intractable problem for the in-
ternational community, whose apparent impotence is compounded by the fact that fo-
reign powers no longer have a stake in a land that has lost its strategic value and, at 
least for the moment, does not offer any strong new business incentive to outsiders. Un-
doubtedly, progress towards European Union membership will be slow and painstaking, 
and, in the absence of the necessary capital investment required to kickstart the eco-
nomy, the global significance of the region has diminished to a seemingly terminal un-
glamorous and peripheral role, with only their resources to rely on for the foreseeable 
future (Cviic, 1997). 
This paper has tried to give an overview of some of the key themes in the cur-
rent discussion related to ethnic conflict and especially the plight of refugees and dis-
placed persons. It is advantageous to tackle these issues, even though one realizes the 
difficulty of dealing with this subject, its nature and complexity of scope. There is an 
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obvious need for more research in this field, to study these multifaceted issues and see 
how much bearing they have on the discussion of forced migration and refugees. The pa-
per tried to cover a rather wide range of very important topics, seeking to relate the large 
scale forced migrations of the contemporary period to a resurgence of cultural specificity 
and ethnicized nationalism as counterpoints to globalization, then reflecting this upon 
the new concept introduced here – that of Limbo Diasporas. Although the scope of this 
discussion covered many crosscutting variables, such is the nature and extent of the 
phenomenon and a failure to address all the relevant issues would be to underestimate 
the complexity of the problem. 
It seems that more emphasis needs to be given to a novel argument that attributes 
the revival of nationalism and ethnicity, especially in the light of the fairly recent ex-
plosion (after the events of 11th of September) of religious fundamentalism, to a surge in 
resistance to the disruptive, impersonal impact of globalization (Castells, 2002; Scruton, 
2002). The hard logic behind this train of thought lies in the fact that local culture 
seems much harder for globalization to subsume than had been previously thought. In-
deed, the feelings of fear and insecurity shared by many small nations suffering identity 
crisis have, in recent times, often mutated into something much more sinister, resulting 
in a strong revival of ethnicity, nationalism, and even international terrorism. The pro-
cess of globalization cannot be solely blamed, but the gap it has produced between the 
“haves and the have nots”, has not helped, leading instead to a growth in poverty, 
dictatorship and autocratic regimes, as well as religious fundamentalism and conserva-
tism and the exclusion of whole fragments of societies, with each factor in turn 
reinforcing the other. Religious fundamentalism is an inevitable consequence of percei-
ved threats to a nation’s ethnicity, identity and character, filling the ideological void 
created where political oppression, cultural and intellectual stagnation have set in and 
social and economic despair cripple the people.  
Stephen Castles and Alastair Davidson have observed that an important aspect 
of globalization is that it has undermined the ideology of relatively autonomous natio-
nal cultures, constituting a force that works, and therefore against nationalism itself. In 
many respects, autonomous national cultures were largely a myth as virtually every na-
tion-state is made up of a number of ethnic groups, with distinct languages, traditions 
and histories (Castles and Davidson, 2000). On the other hand, the increasing impact of 
globalization and the dynamic changes involving population movements will inevitably 
produce newer forms of ethnic contact and dynamic pressures for internal changes. The 
potential for ethnic conflict to remain a major social phenomenon is unlikely to end 
(UNESCO, 1995).  
The resurrection of ethno-nationalism could also have been motivated to some ex-
tent by a rejection of homogenization and westernization associated with some forms of 
globalization. A raising of regional, ethnic and local levels of self-consciousness may be 
seen as a reasonably efficient means to prevent some of the unwanted effects of globali-
zation. The difficulty is that globalization can also provide solutions for underdevelop-
ment, backwardness and provincialism, democracy and human rights. It is also true that 
in such a complicated world of global networks, people tend to regroup around their pri-
mary identities: religious, ethnic, territorial and national.  
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The paper tried to avoid, as much as possible, falling into the trap of over-norma-
tivism and has ignored the currently fashionable notions that “certain questions do not 
even need to be asked at all” and “we do not have to create unnecessary problems for 
ourselves”. Its purpose was to create an arena for analysis, a thinking discourse, which 
would take the most pertinent components of discussion into consideration, making them 
the focus, i.e. thematizing. Even though this was beyond the scope of the paper, the dis-
course nonetheless tried to stress these complex issues, as well as provide pointers for the 
case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a place of diverse ethnic groups, different religions, 
separate lives and of dispersed and lost citizens in limbo status. 
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Tigran Hasic 
ETNIČKI SUKOB I PRAVO NA POVRATAK LIMBO DIJASPORE: VIŠESTRUKI POGLEDI 
NA SLUČAJ BIH 
SAŽETAK 
U članku se razmatra fenomen izbjeglica i preseljenih osoba u procesu prisilnih migracija kao 
posljedice velikih nesreća koje je prouzročio čovjek. Premda neke ovdje predstavljene ideje mogu 
imati širu primjenu, težište je na postkonfliktnim zonama bivše Jugoslavije, odnosno BiH. Pitanja et-
ničnosti i nacionalizma u okviru preseljenja, premještanja i imigracije u članku se rabe kao pozadina 
na koju se kratko reflektiraju i pitanja o globalizaciji. Namjera nije pokriti širok raspon vrlo važnih 
tema, nego samo prikazati probleme koji se javljaju u suvremenim masovnim prisilnim migracijama 
do ponovnog oživljavanja kulturne posebnosti i etniciziranog nacionalizma kao opreke globalizaciji. 
Uvodi se pojam »limbo dijaspore« za bosanske izbjeglice u Švedskoj slijedom refleksije i povezanosti 
s prije navedenim konceptima. Članak završava nekim preporukama i otvorenim pitanjima o druš-
tvenoj rehabilitaciji i etničkom liječenju, te donosi neke opće zaključke. 
KLJUČNE RIJEČI: izbjeglice, prisilna migracija, globalizacija, etničnost, limbo dijaspora 
Tigran Hasic 
CONFLIT ETHNIQUE ET DROIT AU RETOUR DES DIASPORAS « DANS LES LIMBES »: 
REGARDS MULTIPLES SUR LE CAS DE LA BOSNIE-HERZEGOVINE 
RÉSUMÉ 
Cet article étudie le phénomène des réfugiés et personnes déplacées dans le processus de mi-
grations forcées, conséquence des grands désastres provoqués par l’homme. Bien que certaines idées 
présentées ici puissent s’appliquer de façon plus large, elles sont focalisées sur les zones d’après le 
conflit en ex-Yougoslavie, plus précisément la Bosnie-Herzégovine. Les questions de l’ethnicité et du 
nationalisme dans les déplacements, la réinstallation et les immigrations des communautés apporte ici 
une toile de fond sur laquelle se réfléchit également la question de la globalisation. L’intention de 
l’auteur n’est pas de couvrir un vaste spectre de thèmes brûlants, mais seulement de mettre le doigt sur 
les problèmes qui se manifestent dans les migrations massives contemporaines, jusqu’à la résurgence de 
la spécificité culturelle et du nationalisme ethnicisé en tant que contrepoints à la globalisation. L’auteur 
introduit la notion de diaspora « dans les limbes » pour les réfugiés bosniaques en Suède, à travers une 
réflexion et une mise en rapport de ce cas avec les concepts précédemment exposés. L’article s’achève 
par quelques conseils et questions ouvertes sur la réhabilitation sociale et la cicatrisation ethnique, et 
fournit quelques conclusions générales. 
MOTS CLÉS : réfugiés, migration forcée, globalisation, ethnicité, diaspora « dans les limbes »
